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Case Comment
Jurisdiction Over Intertwined Contract Violation and
Fair Representation Claims Under the Railway
Labor Act: Richins v. Southern Pacific Co.
A 1965 Memorandum of Agreement between the Southern
Pacific Transportation Company (the Railroad) and the Broth-
erhood of Railway Carmen and System Federation No. 114 (the
Union) governed the relative seniority of carmen apprentices
and carmen helpers., This agreement was modified when
Southern Pacific merged with another railroad company in 1968
in order to dovetail the seniority rosters of the two companies.2
Union members Richins and six other employees and former
employees of the Railroad subsequently claimed a violation of
the 1965 agreement, alleging that they were demoted and finally
furloughed from their positions as "Upgraded Carmen Appren-
tices," while "Upgraded Carmen Helpers" were not demoted al-
though they should have been demoted first under the 1965
agreement. The Upgraded Apprentices further alleged that the
Union prevented them from filing a timely claim with the Na-
tional Railroad Adjustment Board by consistently and mali-
ciously misleading them as to their rights, and refusing to
protest their furlough3 in violation of the Union's duty of fair
representation. The Railroad and the Union responded that the
Upgraded Apprentices' claims were not meritorious under a
1968 modification to the original agreement. The Upgraded Ap-
prentices' suit against the Railroad and the Union in federal
district court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.4 The Court
1. Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., No. 77-0038, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Utah Sept.
6,1978).
2. Dovetailing is the procedure whereby employees of companies are
merged on a seniority list which is based on the employees' original dates of
hire with either of the merged companies. See Highway Truck Drivers & Help-
ers, Local 107 v. Motor Transp. Labor Relations, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 782, 783 (E.D.
Pa. 1964).
3. Many of the Union members, former employees of the merging com-
pany, allegedly refused to protest plaintiffs' furlough. Richins v. Southern Pac.
Co., No. 77-0038, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Utah Sept. 6, 1978).
4. See Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., No. 77-0038, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Utah
Sept. 6, 1978). Though often loosely referred to as jurisdiction, the question ac-
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of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that a fed-
eral court has jurisdiction over intertwined contract violation
and fair representation claims against a railroad employer and
its employees' union. Richins v. Southern Pacific Co., 620 F.2d
761, 763 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 918 (1981).
Congress established the National Railroad Adjustment
Board as the railroad industry's court of last resort.5 Creation
of the Board arose out of Congress's desire for an expert and
impartial tribunal for settlement of labor disputes.6 To this
end, the Board is bipartisan, with management and union rep-
resentatives each filling seventeen of the Board's thirty-four
positions.7
Although it was at first unclear whether section 3 of the
Railway Labor Act (RLA)8 deprived state and federal courts of
jurisdiction over so-called minor contract disputes,9 the courts
subsequently determined that the Board possessed exclusive
original jurisdiction in such cases.'0 Minor disputes concern
tually is whether the tribunal is competent to hear the suit. See, e.g.,
Rumbaugh v. Winifrede RR., 331 F.2d 530, 535 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
929 (1964); Cunningham v. Erie R, 266 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1959). "Jurisdic-
tion" is used in this sense throughout this Comment.
5. Kroner, Minor D s Under the Railway Labor Act: A Critical Ap-
praisal, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 41, 41 (1962).
6. See U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE, INQUIRY RELATING TO THE NATIONAL RAILROAD -usTmuENT BOARD, BOOK
II, 106, 120, 151 (1939). See also 78 CoNG. REc. 11,718 (1934). Unlike the strictly
bipartisan boards which preceded it, the Board was to avoid the problem of
deadlocks through the provision for appointment of a neutral referee in such
situations. See 78 CONG. REc. 11,713, 11,715 (1934).
7. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (a) (1976). The Board originally was comprised of
thirty-six members; half were selected by the carriers and half by the labor or-
ganizations. Act of June 21, 1934, Pub. L. No. 89-456, ch. 691, § 3(a), 48 Stat. 1189.
See Thompson v. New York Cent. R.R., 361 F.2d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 1966); Kroner,
supra note 5, at 43. The membership of adjustment boards is designed to rep-
resent management and the union. Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401
F.2d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969).
8. Under section 3 of the RLA, when an adjustment cannot be reached by
the usual procedures between railroad and employee,
disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or
carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or appli-
cation of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working condi-
tions ... may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party
to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board.
45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1976).
9. The Supreme Court in Moore v. Illinois Cent. MR., 312 U.S. 630 (1941),
seemed to indicate that all three tribunals shared concurrent jurisdictions.
Kroner, supra note 5, at 57. See Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320,
321-22 (1972).
10. These cases repudiated Moore's reasoning. See Andrews v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 322 (1972); Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 328
(1969); Kroner, supra note 5, at 57-59. See generally 39 MARQ. L. REv. 67, 68
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the interpretation or application of pre-existing agreements,"
in contrast to major disputes which arise out of the formation
or change of collective bargaining agreements covering rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions.12 According to the United
States Supreme Court in Union Pacific Railroad v. Sheehan,13
"Congress considered it essential to keep these so-called 'mi-
nor' disputes within the Adjustment Board and out of the
courts."14 Congress believed that the Board would provide ef-
fective, efficient remedies in employee-railroad disputes involv-
ing the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements,
thereby promoting stability in labor-management relations.15
Moreover, the Third Circuit recently observed that the Board's
expertise in construing railroad contracts enables it to secure
prompt, orderly, and final resolution of everyday grievances in-
volving rates of pay, rules, and working conditions. 16 In addi-
tion, the Board's bipartisan representation is well suited to
resolving such disputes.17
In contrast to the Board's original jurisdiction in minor con-
tractual disputes, the Supreme Court has held that the Board is
incompetent to hear fair representation claims.18 The Court's
rationale for thus delineating the Board's jurisdiction was that
section 3 of the RLA, by its express terms, applies only to suits
between the railroad and its employees.19 Later decisions elab-
(1955). Reference of such disputes to the Board was a matter of compulsion,
not option. See Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. at 322. This compul-
sory character stems not from any contractual agreement of the parties but
from the Act itself Id. at 323.
11. See Bonin v. American Airlines, Inc., 621 F.2d 635, 637 (5th Cir. 1980);
Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Tranp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 754 n.6 (3d Cir. 1978); Kroner,
supra note 5, at 44.
12. See Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 755 n.11 (3d Cir.
1978). The difference between major and minor disputes divides the Board's ju-
risdiction and functions from those of the National Mediation Board. See Elgin,
Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722 (1945). The National Mediation Board
has jurisdiction over major disputes. Id. at 725.
13. 439 U.S. 89 (1978).
14. Id. at 94, quoted in Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 762 (10th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 918 (1981). See Devita v. Burlington N., Inc.,
494 F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
15. Union Pac. R.R v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978).
16. See Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir.
1977).
17. See notes 23-28 infra and accompanying text.
18. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1957). In Conley, minorities alleg-
edly were demoted or discharged and then replaced by whites, after the rail-
road told them that their jobs were being abolished. Plaintiffs further alleged
that the union, acting according to plan, refused to protect them from discrimi-
nation despite their repeated pleas. Id. at 43.
19. Id. at 44. The RLA provides:
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orate that in addition to the express statutory limitation of the
Board's jurisdictional competence, by its very makeup the
Board is institutionally incapable of the impartiality necessary
to remedy breaches of the fair representation duty.o Because
the RLA permits the national labor organization chosen by a
majority of the crafts to "prescribe the rules under which the
labor members of the Adjustment Board shall be selected" and
"to select such members and designate the division on which
each member shall serve," employees would be required to ap-
pear before a group largely made up of the union against whom
they are complaining.2 1 Original jurisdiction over major con-
tractual disputes and unfair representation claims therefore
rests in the district court.22
The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a
carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpreta-
tion or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions, including cases pending and unadjusted on June
21, 1934, shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the
chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such dis-
putes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes
may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the ap-
propriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the
facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.
45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) (1976) (emphasis added). See also Jones v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 796 (2d Cir. 1974); Brady v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969). This
lack of reference to disputes between employees and their bargaining repre-
sentatives means that section 153 First (i) gives no power to the Board to hear
fair representation claims; nor do other provisions of the Act. See Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1957); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 205
(1944); Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R., 331 F.2d 530, 536 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 929 (1964).
20. At one time, the Board was thought to be incapable of remedying such
claims. Since the Board declined to entertain grievance complaints by individ-
ual members of a craft represented by a union, see Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R,
323 U.S. 192, 205 (1944), the only way for the individual to prevail was to have
the union carry his case to the Board. Id. (citing ATTORNEY GENERAi's COM-
MIrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERN-
zENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 4 at 7 (1941)).
Individual employees now have standing before the Board, irrespective of the
union's position. Thompson v. New York Cent. R.R., 361 F.2d 137, 143, 149 (2d
Cir. 1966).
21. Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 330 (1969); Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 206 (1944).
22. See Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 28 (1970). Nevertheless, some courts
require exhaustion of administrative remedies before a fair representation
claim is capable of judicial cognizance, notwithstanding Czosek's explicit state-
ment that exhaustion is not required. See, e.g., Mills v. Long Island R.R., 515
F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1975) (major dispute); Conrad v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 494 F.2d
914, 917 (7th Cir. 1974) (contract violation and fair representation claims); Hill
v. Southern Ry., 402 F. Supp. 414, 417-18 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (contract violation
claim); Sensabaugh v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 1398, 1402
(W.D. Va. 1972) (fair representation claim). One may be excused from ex-
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Given the division of jurisdiction between the Board and
the courts, disputes involving intertwined allegations of minor
contractual violations and unfair representation claims present
two jurisdictional issues: the effect of joining parties and the
effect of joining claims. Because the Board exercises exclusive
original jurisdiction over minor contract disputes,23 but the
Board's personal jurisdiction extends only to the railroad and
its employees,24 situations in which the union was sought to be
joined in minor contractual disputes created jurisdictional diffi-
culties. 25 Suits in which employees alleged that the union was
in collusion with the railroad typically raised this issue. The
Supreme Court resolved this aspect of the jurisdictional prob-
lem by holding that under these circumstances, the district
court may hear the suit, notwithstanding the Board's original
jurisdiction.2 6
The more difficult problem involves the joining of claims of
unfair representation and claims involving minor contractual
disputes, since the Board's jurisdiction over the minor contrac-
tual dispute is exclusive, 27 but only the district court is compe-
tent to hear the unfair representation claim.28 The Third
Circuit resolved this dilemma by analogizing to the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction,29 allowing the Board to hear claims which
hausting administrative remedies, however, where pursuit of such remedies
would be futile. Conrad v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 494 F.2d 914, 917 (7th Cir. 1974).
But see Hill v. Southern Ry., 402 F. Supp. 414, 417 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Sensabaugh
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (W.D. Va. 1972).
23. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
24. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
25. See Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 328 (1969). See also note
10 supra and accompanying text.
26. See Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 325 (1969). In Glover,
plaintiff alleged that the railroad and union tacitly agreed to cooperate in a plan
to avoid promoting black employees. Although the railroad was joined to in-
sure full relief; the Court characterized the dispute as one essentially between
employees on one side and the employer and union on the other, rather than
between "an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers." Id. at
329.
Although the allegations in Glover do not explicitly set forth claims of con-
tract violation and breach of the duty of fair representation, the factual allega-
tions appear to make out such claims, see id. at 325-27, and the Court's
treatment of the case indicates that it viewed the allegations in this way, see id.
at 328-29.
27. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
28. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
29. Actually, the Third Circuit's holding is more like the converse of pen-
dent jurisdiction. Pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine that allows a federal court
to take jurisdiction over a nonfederal claim when joined with a federal claim
that is substantial, where both claims together make up a single cause of ac-
tion. See Rumbaugh v. Winifrede RB., 331 F.2d 530, 539 (4th Cir.), cer. denied,
379 U.S. 929 (1964); Annot., 5 A.L-R.3d 1040, 1047 (1966).
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are "primarily" contractual. 30 For example, in Roberts v. Lehigh
& N.E. Ry.,31 the court held that the Board has exclusive juris-
diction over a dispute between railroad employees on the one
hand and the railroad and union on the other, the resolution of
which depends on contractual interpretation. 32 In Roberts, the
plaintiffs alleged that they were involuntarily retired without
severance pay and removed from seniority rosters contrary to
memorandum agreements, and that the union refused to pro-
cess their claims or appeal internally.33 Similarly, in Goclowski
v. Penn Central Transportation Co.,34 the Third Circuit held
that the employees' request to invalidate an allegedly unau-
thorized extension of the collective bargaining agreements af-
fecting seniority required the Board's expertise in construing
railroad labor contracts.35 The Goclowski court adopted the
Roberts test and noted that the claim required "close examina-
tion of the pertinent collective bargaining agreements." 36 The
court further noted that the joinder of the union for alleged
breach of the duty of fair representation did not destroy the
Board's jurisdiction.37
Rejecting the Third Circuit's rationale allowing the Board
to have pendent jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit in Richins held
that the district court properly had jurisdiction over inter-
twined breach of contract and fair representation claims. 38 Ab-
sent clearer guidance from the Supreme Court, the court was
unwilling to bifurcate the proceeding with the claim against the
Railroad presented to the Board and the fair representation
claim heard in federal court.3 9 The court believed that the Rail-
road should be made a party to the fair representation claim,
30. See Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 763 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 918 (1981) (citing e.g., Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co.,
571 F.2d 747, 755-56 (3d Cir. 1978)).
31. 323 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1963).
32. Id. at 224.
33. Id. at 222.
34. 571 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1977).
35. Id. at 755.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 756. Cf. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957) (in suit by em-
ployees against union, joinder of railroad may be requested if necessary); Cun-
ningham v. Erie RL.R, 266 F.2d 411, 414-16 (2d Cir. 1959) (district court had
power to adjudicate claim against railroad as well as union because exclusive
Adjustment Board jurisdiction extended only to employee-employer dis-
putes). See also Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.L, 331 F.2d 530, 537 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964).
38. Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 763 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 101 S. Ct. 918 (1981).
39. Id. at 762.
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since full recovery could not be had in its absence due to the
claim for reinstatement with seniority,40 and duplication of ef-
fort and inconsistent results could arise if two forums were re-
quired to interpret the contract.4 1
The Richins court acknowledged the Supreme Court's
statement that it is "essential to keep ... minor disputes"
before the Board,42 yet it found no support for extending the ju-
risdiction of the Board over intertwined fair representation
claims based primarily on interpretation of a collective bargain-
ing agreement.4 3 The court was unwilling to adopt the Roberts
"primarily" contractual test, because it believed that the bur-
den of determining whether resolution of the dispute turns pri-
marily on contract interpretation would perhaps be impossible
at such an early stage in the proceeding,4 4 and few fair repre-
sentation claims would not have elements of contract interpre-
tation.4 5 Instead, the Richins court chose to follow the
Supreme Court's mandate4 6 that the courts rather than the
Board should exercise jurisdiction over fair representation
claims.4 7
40. Id.
41. Id. at 762-63. Accord, Rumbaugh v. Winifrede RR., 331 F.2d 530, 537
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964).
42. Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 762 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 101 S. Ct. 918 (1981) (quoting Union Pacific R11 v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94
(1978)).
43. See Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 763 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 918 (1981) (citing Goclowski v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 571
F.2d 747, 756 n.13 (3d Cir. 1977) (Glover inapplicable when basis of claim is pri-
marily construction of existing agreement). Even if the Board had jurisdiction
over some fair representation claims, the alleged facts in Richins are very simi-
lar to Czosek, according to the Richins court, where the federal court's jurisdic-
tion was said to be beyond doubt. 620 F.2d at 763. In Czosek, plaintiff
employees were furloughed and never recalled by the railroad. Plaintiffs al-
leged that they were wrongfully discharged by the railroad and that the union
arbitrarily and capriciously refused to process their claims. Czosek v. O'Mara,
397 U.S. 25, 26 (1970).
44. Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 763 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 101 S. Ct. 918 (1981). The court reasoned that the malicious discrimina-
tion charge may create a fair representation claim not dependent primarily on
contract interpretation. See id. (citing Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424
U.S. 554, 571 (1976); Foust v. IBEW, 572 F.2d 710, 715 (10th Cir. 1978)).
45. Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 763 (10th Cir. 1980), cert de-
nied, 101 S. Ct. 918 (1981).
46. See notes 21, 22, 26 supra and accompanying text.
47. Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 763 (10th Cir. 1980), cert de-
nied, 101 S. Ct. 918 (1981). The court reasoned that "[a]lthough the Supreme
Court did not decide whether the employer may always be sued with the union
... for breach of the duty of fair representation," id. (emphasis in original)
(quoting Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 30 (1970)), such a quit is the only one
approved by the Supreme Court. 620 F.2d at 763 (citing Glover v. St. Louis-S.F.
Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969)). In addition, the Richins court observed that Czosek's
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Considerations of adjudicative efficiency and institutional
competency are at the core of the Richins decision to place ju-
risdiction over intertwined fair representation and contract in-
terpretation claims in the district court. Where the two claims
are truly intertwined, it would be inefficient to bifurcate the
suit, relegating the contractual issues to the Board while al-
lowing the district court to hear only the fair representation
claim, because the evidentiary showing before either tribunal is
likely to be similar. Moreover, by severing the two issues, the
parties run the risk of inconsistent results. Inconsistent results
are especially unfortunate where plaintiffs allege collusion be-
tween the union and the employer.48 These pitfalls can be
avoided, however, by trying the contractual claim pendent to
the district court's jurisdiction over the unfair representation
claimA9 This would prevent piecemeal litigation,5 0 promote ju-
dicial economy, and create more expeditious disposition of
controversies.51
strong statement that the Board has no jurisdiction over fair representation
claims is not repudiated by language in Union Pac. RR. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89
(1978), giving the Board jurisdiction over minor disputes. See 620 F.2d at 763.
48. See Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 762-63 (10th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 918 (1981).
49. Where there is federal jurisdiction over the claim against one party, a
closely related nonfederal claim may be brought in under pendent jurisdiction.
See Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 566 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See also note 29 supra.
50. See Wolfson v. Blumberg, 229 F. Supp. 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), appeal
dismissed, 340 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1965).
If the district court has power to proceed against the union it also has
power over the railroad since "[it would be absurd to require this closely inte-
grated suit to be cut up into segments." Cunningham v. Erie RJ.R, 266 F.2d 411,
416 (2d Cir. 1959) (citations omitted).
51. See Wolfson v. Blumberg, 229 F. Supp. 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), appeal
dismissed, 340 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1965).
In terms of the problems traditionally associated with joining parties and
joining claims, the Richins court was correct in refusing to split the proceeding.
First, joining the Railroad to the fair representation claim against the Union
should not destroy the district court's jurisdiction because the facts are consis-
tent with a pattern of collusion between the Railroad and the Union. Richins v.
Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 762 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 918
(1981). Thus, the implication is that the Railroad is at least a permissive party
to a fair representation claim against the Union. See FED. R. Crv. P. 20(a). See
also Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R., 331 F.2d 530, 537 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 929 (1964). Although a district court cannot give full relief if the Railroad is
not a party, this is not a case where the Railroad is joined merely to provide
complete relief. Consequently, the suit is not one primarily between employ-
ees and their union so as to warrant the Railroad's dismissal, but rather "is one
between some employees on the one hand and the union and management on
the other [so] ... [t]he federal courts may therefore properly exercise juris-
diction over both the union and the railroad." Glover v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 393
[Vol. 66:209
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Although the dangers of inefficient or inconsistent adjudi-
cation are avoided by consolidating the claims before either the
district court or the Board, the district court is institutionally
better suited to hear these intertwined claims, and Richins was
correct in remanding the case to that forum. Nevertheless, the
court's holding is subject to abuse because aggrieved employ-
ees may assert a spurious fair representation claim for the sole
purpose of avoiding the Board's otherwise mandatory jurisdic-
tion over the underlying contractual dispute. The Richins hold-
ing, therefore, should be tempered by a good faith test; an
employee presenting an intertwined claim to the district court
should be allowed to proceed only upon a pretrial showing suf-
ficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.
Although these considerations militate against bifurcating
intertwined claims, under the "primarily" contractual test pro-
posed by the Third Circuit in Roberts and Goclowski52 claims
could be consolidated before the Board rather than the district
court. Thus, the true justification for vesting jurisdiction over
intertwined claims in the district court lies in the institutional
competency of the two tribunals.
The Board is well suited to resolving questions of contract
interpretation because the Board has expertise in interpreting
railway collective bargaining agreements. 3 Half of its mem-
bers are selected by railroad employees' unions and half by
railroads.5 4 Board members usually come from high positions
within these organizations,55 and thus are familiar56 with the
U.S. 324, 329 (1969). Cf Haley v. Childers, 314 F.2d 610, 615, 617-18 (8th Cir. 1963)
(railroad dismissal proper where only joined to give complete relief, suit was
primarily between employees and union, and only valid claim against railroad
draws into controversy interpretation and application of collective bargaining
agreement); Cunningham v. Erie R.R, 266 F.2d 411, 416 (2d Cir. 1959) (railroad
must stay in proceeding in order to give complete relief); Wade v. Southern
Pac. Co., 243 F. Supp. 307, 311 (S.D. Tex. 1965) (same). Second, as to the effect
of joining claims, the fair representation and contract violation claims and the
prayers for relief are not easily separable. Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620
F.2d 761, 762 (10th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 101 S. Ct. 918 (1981).
52. See notes 29-37 supra and accompanying text.
53. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
54. Aaron, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation Under the Railway La-
bor and National Labor Relations Acts, 34 J. Am L. & CoM. 167, 169 (1968), re-
printed in U.C.L.A. INsT. or INDus. REL., REPRINT No. 189, at 169 (1968).
55. Daugherty, Arbitration by the National Railroad Adjustment Board,
ARBrrRATiON TODAY 93, 100 (J. McKelvey ed. 1955).
56. Id.I Wells, Federal-State Jurisdiction in Railway Labor Relations, NEw
YoR UNIvERsrrY SEvENT ANNuAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 29, 42 (E. Stein ed.
1954).
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customs, usages, and procedures of the railway labor field57 and
the technicalities and complexities of railroading. 58
Moreover, the bipartisan makeup of the Board makes it a
particularly appropriate forum for contract violation claims.
Both parties to the collective bargaining agreement-the union
and the railroad-are represented on the Board.59 Thus, Board
members may expertly determine what the parties meant by
provisions and language in the agreement. Additionally, Board
members tend to be strongly partisan, acting more as advocates
than as judges.60 This is appropriate in a contract violation
claim against the railroad since the union representatives
would presumably act in the employees' interest,61 serving as a
check on the railroad representatives, and the railroad repre-
sentatives would likewise act as a check on the union
representatives.
The Board is not suited for fair representation claims, how-
ever, in that its expertise in minor disputes62 is inapposite to
problems of fair representation.63 Arbitrary, discriminatory, or
bad faith conduct by a union toward a member of the collective
bargaining agreement breaches the duty of fair representa-
tion.64 Consequently, a union might bargain for discriminatory
contract provisions,65 give inadequate attention to a griev-
ance,66 or fail to discharge its duty of fair representation in
some other manner indicating its bad faith.67 A knowledge of
57. Taylor v. Hudson Rapid Tubes Corp., 362 F.2d 748, 750-51 (3d Cir. 1966);
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 327 U.S. 661, 664 (1946).
58. Daugherty, .supra note 55, at 100. The members speak the railroad
jargon, Wells, supra note 56, at 42, and know the problems, policies, and posi-
tions of the railroads and unions. See Murphy, Agreement on the Railroads--
The Joint Railway Conference of 1926, 11 LAB. LJ. 823, 835 (1960), reprinted in
NEW YORK STATE SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS AT CORNELL
UNrvEsrrY, REPRnT SERIES No. 98, at 823, 835 (1960).
59. See Drapkin & Davis, Health and Safety in Union Contracts: Power or
Liability?, 65 Min. L. REv. 635, 642 (1981).
60. Daugherty, supra note 55, at 100.
61. See generally Murphy, supra note 58, at 834 (RIA was enacted to settle
differences between employers and employees).
62. See Monaghan v. Central Vt. Ry., 404 F. Supp. 683, 686 (D. Mass. 1975).
63. See note 59 supra. Expertise tends to indicate bias. See Daugherty,
supra note 55, at 101.
64. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). See Note, Union Liability for
Employer Discrimination, 93 HAnv. L REV. 702, 703 (1980).
65. See Steele v. Louisville & N.LR., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944).
66. See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975);
Figuero de Arroyo v. Sindacato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 284
(1st Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
67. See Drapkin & Davis, supra note 59, at 639. A fair representation claim
may properly arise if the claim of malicious discrimination sufficiently alleges
bad faith and ill will. See Roberts v. Lehigh & N.E. Ry., 323 F.2d 219,223 (3d Cir.
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railroading is not useful in evaluating these kinds of breaches,68
which are patterned after violations of common law fiduciary
obligations.69
The Board's bipartisan representation is also suspect in
cases involving intertwined claims of fair representation and
contract interpretation. Because the basis of the fair represen-
tation claim is that the union has not discharged its duty to the
plaintiff, the assumption that the Board's union representatives
will be more sympathetic to the plaintiff than to the railroadO
is no longer valid.7 '
The federal district court is therefore the appropriate fo-
rum for intertwined contract and fair representation claims.
Courts routinely interpret contracts and determine fair repre-
sentation claims.7 2 Moreover, courts regularly rule on fiduciary
duties and relationships in a variety of contexts. Finally, in
contrast to the Board, the trier of fact in the district court is
less likely to be influenced by partisan allegiance because there
is no direct interest in the outcome of the controversy. Thus,
the Richins holding that intertwined claims belong before the
court is correct on the strength of the institutional competence
of the district court and the problems of bias inherent in the
Board's composition. 3
1963). Although some courts have refused to find the requisite hostile discrimi-
nation on facts similar to Richins, see, e.g., Thompson v. New York Cent. RIL,
361 F2d 137, 138-42 (2d Cir. 1966), others have so found, see, e.g., Brady v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87, 90-93 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1048
(1968). The Eighth Circuit has stated that "where a good faith allegation of dis-
crimination is made, specific facts in support of the general allegations need
not be set forth and a court may not dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction."
Haley v. Childers, 314 F.2d 610, 616 (8th Cir. 1963) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 (1957)); Ferro v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir.
1961); Sells v. International Brotherhood of Firemen & Oilers, 190 F. Supp. 857,
860 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
68. Nor are such determinations aided by experience with the RLA, since
the duty of fair representation is not expressly mentioned therein, but rather
has been inferred from powers delegated by Congress to unions under the stat-
ute. Aaron, supra note 54, at 167.
69. Id at 182.
70. See 78 CONG. REC. 11,714, 11,718 (1934). But cf. id. at 11,716 (employers
vitally interested in welfare of employees).
71. Aaron, supra note 54, at 170. See Carroll v. Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men, 417 F.2d 1025, 1027 (1st Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970). Board
jurisdiction in such cases would facilitate the union in avoiding its duty of fair
representation. Aaron, supra note 54 at 170.
72. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
73. Moreover, the joining of the railroad to a fair representation claim
against the union does not destroy the court's jurisdiction, see id, at 45, at least
where the railroad is joined because it actively participated in the union's dis-
criminatory conduct that was the basis of the fair representation claim.
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Vesting jurisdiction over intertwined claims in the district
court assumes, however, that the fair representation claim is
asserted in good faith. This assumption is subject to abuse
since employees might "allege hostile discrimination on the
part of the union in every contract interpretation suit under the
Railway Labor Act ... ."74 Moreover, a rule giving the courts
jurisdiction over hybrid claims where contract interpretation is
so incidental that the railroad's joinder is required solely to af-
ford complete relief7 5 would destroy the integrity of the Board
as the exclusive tribunal for resolution of "minor" disputes. 76
To promote the integrity of the Board and to guard against
abuse, the court should therefore test the validity of every in-
tertwined fair representation claim. The court should hold a
pretrial conference to determine whether the fair representa-
tion claim rests on sufficient evidence to withstand a motion to
dismiss for failure to establish the court's competency. If the
plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of breach of the duty of
fair representation, the federal court should be presumed the
appropriate forum for both claims, subject to rebuttal by show-
Rumbaugh v. Winifrede R.R, 331 F.2d 530, 536-37 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
929 (1964). Apparently this is alleged to be the situation in Richins, since the
court found that the evidence supported a finding of a pattern of collusion be-
tween the Railroad and the Union. Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 760,
762 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 918 (1981). Although plaintiffs' dam-
ages allegedly followed from the misleading conduct of the Union, see Harrison
v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 562-63 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 958 (1976), it was immediately caused by the Railroad's furloughing the
plaintiffs. Therefore, the Union and the Railroad should be held liable. See id.;
Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1974). Because
the Railroad allegedly colluded with the Union, there is good reason to stretch
jurisdiction over the Railroad as well as the Union. Cf. Harrison v. United
Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 561, 563 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958
(1976) (fair representation claim against union may be heard in court but there
is no reason to stretch the statute to allow employees to maintain an original
cause of action against the railroad, case might be different if railroad and
union acted in concert to discriminate or railroad agreed with union to breach
union's duty to give employee timely notice while having knowledge of that
duty).
74. Wade v. Southern Pac. Co., 243 F. Supp. 307, 312 (S.D. Tex. 1965). Cf.
Hill v. Southern Ry., 402 F. Supp. 414,418 (W.D.N.C. 1975) ("Plaintiff is now ask-
ing to join an additional party as the clock strikes midnight in the hope of qual-
ifying for an exception to the Andrews rule" of exclusive Board jurisdiction
over minor disputes.).
75. In such a situation, the fact that the Board is not authorized to hear
disputes against a union is not altered by the joinder. See Brady v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87, 93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1968).
76. See Andrews v. Louisville & N.LR., 406 U.S. 320, 322 (1971); notes 15-16
supra and accompanying text. The Board's jurisdiction is suspect, however,
when a bona fide fair representation claim is raised. See notes 62-71 supra and
accompanying text.
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ing the severability of the contract violation claim. If the claims
are severed, the contract claim should be decided by the Board,
and, unless clearly erroneous, its decision should be binding on
the court.
This good faith test is preferable to the approach adopted
by the Third Circuit in Roberts and Goclowski, under which
the Board retains jurisdiction over intertwined claims that are
"primarily" contractual. 77 Although neither Roberts nor
Goclowski define the term "primarily," the Roberts court
stated that the test is whether "the resolution of the differences
between railroad employees, on one side, and the railroad and
the unions, on the other, depends on the interpretation of dis-
puted terms of the collective bargaining agreement .... 178
This test is unworkable because such a determination is too
difficult to make at such an early stage of the proceeding. To
evaluate whether a claim is "primarily" contractual under that
test would require a decision on the merits of the alleged con-
tract violation.79 By contrast, the good faith test is not contin-
gent on the outcome of the claims, thus enabling the court to
rule on the jurisdictional question without reaching the merits.
In conclusion, the Richins court was correct in finding the
federal district court, rather than the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board, competent to hear a contract violation claim
against the Railroad and the Union. Intertwined claims have
caused problems in the past because the Board exercises origi-
77. See notes 29-37 supra and accompanying text.
78. Roberts v. Lehigh & N.E. Ry., 323 F.2d 219, 222 (3d Cir. 1963) (emphasis
added).
79. This proposition is not undermined by the application of the contract
interpretation test in Goclowski since there the factual basis of the contract vi-
olation claim was distinct from that of the fair representation claim. See
Goclowski v. Penn Cent Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747, 754 (3d Cir. 1977). The
Goclowski court bifurcated the proceeding, holding that while the district court
was competent to hear both the railroad and the union on the unfair represen-
tation claim under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, because proof of the
railroad's collusion "would amount to an undermining of the collective bargain-
ing agreements," id at 761 n.18, the contract claim was a "minor dispute" which
could only be properly heard before the Board. Because of this potential for
undermining the collective bargaining agreement, it appears that the fair repre-
sentation claim in Goclowski, like virtually all such claims, at least colorably
involves questions of interpretation or application of a collective bargaining
agreement. Richins v. Southern Pac. Co., 620 F.2d 761, 763 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct 918 (1981). It would be peculiar, however, to confer pri-
mary jurisdiction over an entire case on the Board "because a potential de-
fense to a valid complaint of hostile discrimination might involve questions of
contract interpretation." Thompson v. New York Cent. R.R., 361 F.2d 137, 149
(2d Cir. 1966) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (em-
phasis in original).
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nal jurisdiction over disputes involving contractual interpreta-
tion, yet its jurisdiction is expressly limited to disputes
between the Railroad and its employees. Because the Union is
a necessary party to a fair representation claim, intertwined
claims raise a barrier to the Board's jurisdiction. Some courts
have severed intertwined claims, but considerations of adjudi-
cative efficiency and the danger of inconsistent outcomes mili-
tate against this result. Thus, while the courts are generally in
accord that intertwined claims can be consolidated under a the-
ory of pendent jurisdiction, they have split over whether the
district court or the Board is the most appropriate forum. Re-
jecting Third Circuit precedents to the contrary, Richins cor-
rectly recognizes that the district court is institutionally better
suited to hear intertwined claims. The district court routinely
handles both contractual and fair representation claims, and is
a neutral forum. By contrast, the Board's expertise in matters
involving railroads is inapposite to fair representation claims,
and the Board's strongly partisan representation may unduly
prejudice an employee's prospects for relief. These concerns
notwithstanding, the integrity of the Board's jurisdiction over
minor contractual disputes can be preserved only if the district
court hears intertwined claims after determining that the fair
representation claim is raised in good faith, and is not simply
an attempt to avoid the Board's jurisdiction.
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